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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-4468 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
DOWANN ANDRADE,  
                                  a/k/a Red West 
 
DOWANN ANDRADE, 
   Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 10-cr-00864) 
District Judge: Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
Submitted: December 10, 2012 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., NYGAARD, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: January 15, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Dowann Andrade (“Andrade”) appeals the District Court’s December 5, 
2011 Judgment and sentence of 92 months’ imprisonment.  For the reasons that follow, 
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we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recount only the 
essential facts.  On April 26, 2011, Andrade pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and 
possess with the intent to distribute five or more grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  
BACKGROUND 
At sentencing, the District Court assessed an increase in the criminal history 
calculation based on Andrade’s two convictions for violations of New Jersey’s Megan’s 
Law.  Both convictions arose in 2008.  First, Andrade was convicted of a violation of 
condition of special sentence, and was sentenced to two days’ imprisonment, time served, 
and continued community supervision for life.  Later that year, Andrade was convicted of 
failure to register as a sex offender, and was sentenced to one day of imprisonment and 
continued community supervision for life. 
Andrade argued at sentencing that both of these violations were merely 
inconsequential technical violations which should not be the basis for an increase in 
criminal history points.  Although the District Court acknowledged the technical nature 
of the violations, it concluded that an assignment of one criminal history point for either 
of the two violations would raise the criminal history category to V.1
                                                 
1 The record is unclear regarding whether the District Court ultimately assigned 
one criminal history point per violation or whether it only assigned one criminal history 
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Given Andrade’s total offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of V, the 
resulting sentencing range was 84 to 105 months.  The District Court sentenced Andrade 
to 92 months’ imprisonment.  Andrade timely appealed. 
Andrade presents two arguments for our review:  First, the District Court should 
not have awarded him any criminal history points for his two violations of Megan’s Law.  
Second, the District Court’s assignment of criminal history points for these convictions 
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Both arguments are 
without merit. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the District Court’s 
sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
We first consider whether the sentencing court committed “significant procedural error, 
such as failing to [properly calculate] the Guidelines range . . . [or] failing to consider the 
§ 3553(a) factors . . . .”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  “If there is no procedural error, the second 
                                                                                                                                                             
point for one or the other violation.  (App. 64 (“[U]pon viewing this criminal history and 
reading the presentence report, ultimately I would conclude that no more than one of the 
criminal history points — or the points that were assessed [for these two violations] could 
be subtracted.  And that would not change his criminal history [category] from 5 to a 
4.”).)  We need not resolve this uncertainty.  In any event, either violation properly 
supports an increase in the criminal history category. 
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stage of our review is for substantive reasonableness, and we will affirm the sentence 
unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that 
particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.”  United States v. Wright, 
642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Our review of double jeopardy challenges is plenary.  United States v. Dees, 467 
F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006). 
III. 
A. 
ANALYSIS 
Andrade contends that the District Court should not have assessed any criminal 
history points for his two convictions for violating the registration and reporting 
requirements under Megan’s Law.  As an initial matter, any procedural challenge to this 
calculation is meritless.  Each of these convictions is a felony conviction.  U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.2(o) (defining “felony offense” as any “offense punishable by death or a term of 
imprisonment exceeding one year, regardless of the actual sentence imposed”); N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:43-6(a)(4) (imposing a maximum term of incarceration of 18 months for 
violations of Megan’s Law).  As such, under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), each conviction 
merited one criminal history point.   
Criminal History Calculation 
Andrade also argues that these convictions were “technical violations at best,” 
(Appellant Br. 3), and “not real criminal history events,” (Appellant Reply Br. 4).  The 
gist of Andrade’s argument here is that his criminal history, properly calculated, 
overstates the seriousness of his prior criminal conduct.  This argument warrants no 
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substantive retort.  Overstatement is not at issue, nor could it provide Andrade any solace.  
Andrade’s last argument is that the two convictions for Megan’s Law violations 
should have been excluded because they are similar to the offenses listed in U.S.S.G. § 
4A1.2(c).2
Thus, Andrade’s sentence is not procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
  While U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c) provides for the exclusion of certain misdemeanor 
and petty offenses from criminal history calculations, that section unambiguously states 
that “[s]entences for all felony offenses are counted.”  (Emphasis added).  Both of 
Andrade’s Megan’s Law violations are felonies; § 4A1.2’s exceptions are not applicable. 
3
B. 
 
Andrade’s argument that the registration and reporting requirements of Megan’s 
Law violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is foreclosed by our 
decision in Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996).  In 
Artway, we explicitly held that the registration provisions of Megan’s Law do “not offend 
the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, or Bill of Attainder Clauses.”  Id. at 1267. 
Double Jeopardy Clause 
                                                 
2 It appears that this argument was not raised before the District Court.  As such, it 
should be reviewed for plain error only.  United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 
(1993).  This claim falls regardless of the standard of review employed. 
 
3 In his reply brief, Andrade also states that “the main thrust of Appellant’s 
argument at sentencing and in this appeal [is] that Appellant was entitled to a factual 
analysis of the criminal history events, and was not consigned to a mere automatic 
reliance on the terms of the judgments of conviction.”  (Appellant Reply Br. 1.)  We find 
this argument unpersuasive.  Andrade had the opportunity to explain the circumstances 
surrounding these two convictions to the District Court, and did so to no avail.   (App. 37-
40, 52-53, 55-56.)  
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To the extent that Andrade argues that he is placed in double jeopardy because his 
past convictions were used in calculating his current sentence, we reject this argument as 
well.  “The consideration at sentencing of prior convictions has long been held not to 
violate double jeopardy.”  United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1990). 
IV.      
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the Judgment and sentence of the 
District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
